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HOW NICE TO SEE YOU AGAIN: THE REPETITIVE USE OF ARBITRATORS AND THE RISK
OF EVIDENT PARTIALITY
Drew J. Hushka*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Federal Arbitration Act1 (“FAA”) permits federal courts to vacate arbitral
awards “where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them.”2 Interpreting this provision, courts have reached varied conclusions as to what
biases, relationships, and misconducts constitute “evident partiality.”3 A prior business
relationship between a neutral arbitrator and the victorious party,4 an ongoing legal
dispute between the arbitrator and a party,5 a father-son relationship between an arbitrator
and an officer of a labor union that was party to the arbitration,6 representation by the
arbitrator’s law firm to a party in an unrelated matter,7 when the arbitrator is an officer at
a company that conducts business dealings with a party that the arbitrator was not
involved with,8 and when counsel to a party to the arbitration also represents the
arbitrator in an unrelated matter9 have all been held to create evident partiality. Even after
a court determines whether the particular facts create evident partiality, courts still apply
varying standards on the disclosure requirements of the evident partiality.10
Regardless of the exact applicable standard, actual bias may create evident
partiality. With increases in the rates of arbitration today, there is increased concern
about potential biases and partiality. The use of a particular arbitrator for repeated
employment is such an example of such potential bias that may raise to “evident
partiality.” Parties, when choosing arbitrators, logically have an incentive to choose an
arbitrator sympathetic to their position, thereby increasing the probability of a decision in
*
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1
The United States Arbitration Act, 43 Stat. 883, codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012) [hereinafter the
“Federal Arbitration Act” or the “FAA”].
2
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2012).
3
See generally Lee Korland, What an Arbitrator Should Investigate and Disclose: Proposing a New
Test for Evident Partiality Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 815 (2003)
(outlining past decisions finding evident partiality and proposing that arbitrators should be required to
conduct “a reasonable investigation” to disclose any potential conflicts of interest); Jennifer C. Bailey, The
Search to Clarify an Elusive Standard: What Relationships Between Arbitrator and Party Demonstrate
Evident Partiality, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 153 (2000) (discussing past evident partiality decisions and
proposing a “reasonable person” standard in determining evident partiality).
4
See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
5
See Middlesex Mutual Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d 1197 (11th Cir. 1982).
6
See Morelite Constr. Corp. v. New York City Dist. Council Carpenters Ben. Funds, 748 F.2d 79 (2d
Cir. 1984).
7
See Close v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 486 N.E.2d 1275 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985).
8
See Olson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 51 F.3d 157 (8th Cir. 1995).
9
See Beebe Med. Ctr., Inc. v. InSight Health Servs. Corp., 751 A.2d 426 (Del. Ch. 1999).
10
See Kathryn A. Windsor, Defining Arbitrator Evident Partiality: The Catch-22 of Commercial
Litigation Disputes, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 191 (2009) (exploring the split approach to determining
evident partiality stemming from the Supreme Court decision in Commonwealth Coatings between the
Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit).
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their favor. It follows then that a party should be more likely to employ a particular
arbitrator if that arbitrator has previously decided in favor of the party, theoretically
making a repeated outcome more likely. Therefore, this cycle may give arbitrators an
incentive to favor a particular party if the arbitrator desires additional employment
opportunities from that party in the future.11
This incentive may be particularly strong in today’s consumer arbitrations.
Consumer arbitration is a widespread means of efficiently determining consumer
disputes,12 although it is difficult to determine exactly how widespread.13 Because
certain parties, such as business conglomerates, that utilize consumer arbitration are
likely to be involved in multiple arbitrations, arbitrators employed in consumer
arbitration may be particularly susceptible to potential bias created by desire in future
employment.
Consumer arbitration typically involves a repeat seller and a consumer. The
seller, selling the product or service to multiple persons, may become involved in
disputes over each sale.14 Because of this potential for multiple disputes, decisions
favoring the seller could greatly increase the chance of future employment in similar
proceedings for the arbitrator. This incentive, potentially unknown to the consumer,
could create an evident partiality requiring disclosure.15
11

See generally Miles B. Farmer, Mandatory and Fair? A Better System of Mandatory Arbitration,
121 YALE L.J. 2346, 2356-57 (2012) (discussing how “selection bias” of the stronger party in a mandatory
arbitration setting may prejudice the weaker party by selecting favorable arbitrators or arbitration groups);
Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1650 (2005)
(explaining that arbitration companies compete against each other for large arbitration contracts, potentially
favoring the company in arbitrational decisions to keep the contract); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Revising the
FAA to Permit Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 8 NEV. L.J. 214, 217 (2007) (“An
institutional party, who chooses arbitration to resolve all disputes, may have an advantage over the party
who may utilize the arbitral process only once, and only because his contract with the institutional party
requires him to do so. In this situation, the party may develop informal relationships with the arbitrator,
creating an incentive for the arbitrator to find in its favor.” (footnote omitted)).
12
See Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1639 (“One recent study of the ‘average Joe’ in Los Angeles
showed that approximately one-third of the consumer transactions in his life were covered by arbitration
clauses” (footnote omitted)).
13
See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Revolution in Law Through Arbitration, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 233,
235 (2008) (explaining that there is no reliable data measurement for the extent of arbitration).
14
Greater familiarity with arbitration of one party compared to the opposing party is known as the
“repeat-player” problem. See Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1650-51 (outlining that companies in arbitration
have greater exposure to arbitration than the average consumer, and that there is some limited empirical
evidence that the repeat player performs better than the non-repeat player); see also Lisa B. Bingham,
Control Over Dispute-System Design and Mandatory Commercial Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 221, 232 (2004) (“Repeat players operate within a legal framework that affords opportunities to
structure relationships and to set limits on liability . . . The resulting structure may affect the scope of their
risk from a particular kind of claim or dispute.” (footnotes omitted)); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and
Arbitration, The Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and
Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449, 452-53 (1996) (outlining that a party that routinely engages in
alternative dispute resolution may be at a strategic advantage because of greater familiarity with the process
and being in a better position to draft the agreement, and therefore “garner the lion’s share of the potential
befits for himself.” (footnote omitted)).
15
See, e.g., American Arbitration Association Commercial Arbitration Rule 16(a), available at
http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTG_004103&revision=latestreleased (“Any
person appointed or to be appointed as an arbitrator shall disclose to the AAA any circumstances likely to
give rise to justifiable doubt as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence, including any bias or any
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This article will first examine the foundation, rise, and implications of the use of
mandatory consumer arbitration. Next, it will examine the foundation and current state
of arbitrational vacatur for evident partiality. Third, it will examine how repeat
arbitration may be treated by current evident partiality standards. Finally, this article will
examine how application of evident partiality standards can improve mandatory
consumer arbitration by offering a proposal for how repeat arbitration can be treated.
II. THE RISE AND GROWING USE OF MANDATORY CONSUMER ARBITRATION
A. Historical Roots
Voluntary arbitration has long existed in the United States, dating back to the
early Colonial period.16 Traditionally, arbitration was used as a voluntary method of
solving business disputes between two business associates with greater expertise, speed,
efficiency, and privacy than could be achieved through traditional legal proceedings.17
Until recently, the use of arbitration was limited to business-to-business disputes,
management/union disputes, or other disputes involving parties of similar
sophistications.18 These voluntary agreements were generally supported by the courts,19
and eventually codified with the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act (“the FAA”)20
in 1925, requiring all courts to compel arbitration pursuant to such voluntary
agreements.21 It was not until much more recently that businesses began using arbitration
agreements to require consumers, employees, franchises, and other parties to submit
disputes to arbitration, rather than pursuing recourse through the traditional court
system.22 In fact, this sort of compulsory arbitration seems contrary to the original intent
of the FAA. While deliberating the passage of the FAA, one senator voiced concerns
over arbitration contracts being used “on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to captivate customers
or employees”; however, the senator was assured by FAA supporters that the bill was not
intended to cover such situations.23 Nevertheless, over the last several decades, a series
of Supreme Court decisions have allowed businesses to do just that;24 and ever since,
businesses have been able to mandate arbitration on both consumers and employees.25
financial or personal interest in the result of the arbitration or any past or present relationship with the
parties or their representatives.”).
16
See Roger S. Haydock & Jennifer D. Henderson, Arbitration and Judicial Civil Justice: An
American Historical Review and a Proposal for a Private/Arbitral and Public/Judicial Partnership, 2 PEPP.
DISP. RESOL. L.J. 141, 144-45 (2002) (explaining that arbitration began in the United States during the
colonial period in order to avoid expensive court proceedings).
17
Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1635.
18
Id. at 1636.
19
Id.
20
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012).
21
Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1636.
22
Id.
23
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 414 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting)
(citing Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th
Cong. 9-11 (1923)).
24
Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1636; see also Sarah Rudolph Cole, Uniform Arbitration: “One Size
Fits All” Does Not Fit, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 759, 771 (2001) (citing the Supreme Court’s
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Mandatory arbitration, arguably beyond the original intent of the FAA, first began
in the securities industry.26 Since then, it has expanded into nearly every facet of
business, eventually expanding to the financial industry,27 service providers,28 sales,29
health care,30 and education providers.31 One court has even gone so far as to declare that
“[t]he reality that the average consumer frequently loses his/her constitutional rights and
right of access to the court when he/she buys a car, household appliance, insurance
policy, receives medical attention or gets a job rises as a putrid odor which is
overwhelming to the body politic.”32
The rise of consumer arbitration beyond the securities arena presents new and
unique issues.33 First, unlike securities arbitration clauses, which are typically signed as
decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), as allowing the use of arbitration
to expand in an employment setting from less than four percent of business surveyed in 1991, to more than
10 percent in 1995).
25
Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1636
26
See generally Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1636-38 (detailing the rise in enforcement of securities
arbitration from the Supreme Court’s initial refusal to uphold investor arbitration agreements in Wilko v.
Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), to the expanded use of accepted arbitration agreements in Moses H. Cone
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20 (1991)).
27
See, e.g., Wash. Mut. Fin. Group v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that the borrows’
alleged inability to read and understand the arbitration agreement did not render it unconscionable or
unenforceable, and that the lender’s failure to specifically inform the borrowers that they were signing the
arbitration agreement after they learned of their inability to read was not unconscionable); McKenzie
Check Advance of Miss. v. Hardy, 866 So. 2d 446 (Miss. 2004) (upholding the use of an arbitration clause
imposed on payday-loan borrowers even though there was not mutuality of obligation).
28
See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (upholding the use of an
arbitration clause in consumers purchase of termite extermination services as being within the
understanding of Congress’ commerce clause powers); Carbajal v. H&R Block Tax Servs., Inc., 372 F.3d
903 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding the use of an arbitration clause as part of the consumer contract for the
purchase of tax preparation services).
29
See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (upholding the use of an
arbitration clause contained in the warranty brochure within the box on purchasers of personal computers
that was binding unless the computer was returned within 30 days from delivery); Cavalier Mfg., Inc. v.
Clarke, 862 So. 2d 634 (Ala. 2003) (upholding the use of an arbitration clause in the “Acknowledgement
and Agreement” section in the purchase agreement of a mobile home).
30
See, e.g., Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996) (upholding the use of an arbitration clause
imposed on a patient in the operating room); Briarcliff Nursing Home, Inc. v. Turcotte, 894 So. 2d 661
(Ala. 2004) (upholding the use of an arbitration clause on nursing home resident); Hogan v. Country Villa
Health Servs., 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 450 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (upholding the use of an arbitration agreement
signed by the daughter of a nursing home patient who had been given durable power of attorney for health
care decisions); see also Reed R. Bates & Stephen W. Still, Arbitration in Nursing Home Cases: Trends
Issues, and a Glance into the Future, 76 DEF. COUNS. J. 282 (2009) (exploring state trends in the treatment
of arbitration cases related to nursing homes).
31
See, e.g., Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc. 133 F.3d 141 (1st Cir. 1998) (upholding the arbitration
clause used by school in relation to claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act); Fallo v. High-Tech
Inst., 559 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2009) (upholding the use of an arbitration clause used by a vocational school
as neither procedurally unconscionable nor coercive); see also Amanda Harmon Cooley, The Need for
Legal Reform of the For-Profit Educational Industry, 79 TENN. L. REV. 515, 539 (2012) (alleging that forprofit colleges are more commonly using arbitration agreements contained in enrollment agreements to
protect against litigation).
32
Knepp v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 229 B.R. 821, 827 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999).
33
Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1640.
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part of the document package required to hire the brokerage firm, many consumer
arbitration “agreements” are formed without any formal signature.34 Second, securities
arbitration clauses that are typically imposed at the outset of the business-to-customer
relationship, while new consumer arbitration agreements are frequently imposed after the
relationship has already begun.35 Third, the increased use of arbitration in non-securities
transactions has exposed less-educated and knowledgeable persons to arbitration.36
Finally, companies imposing arbitration on their consumers are increasingly using the
arbitration as a means of limiting the abilities of the consumer to seek complete redress.37
These new problems created by the expansion of mandatory arbitration into
consumer settings has received mixed reviews from practitioners. Critics of imposed
mandatory consumer arbitration generally cite consumer welfare as the primary reason to
be cautious of expansion,38 and decry that many arbitration agreements attempt to slant
the arbitral proceedings in favor of the imposing party.39 Additionally, they argue that
the unfairness of the arbitration agreements’ express terms is not the only problem,
because empirical research has shown that arbitration agreements are rarely read by
consumers.40 Furthermore, they contend that even when the agreements are read, they
are often not fully understood.41 Some companies even go as far as to deliberately design
the arbitration agreement to minimize the likelihood that the consumer will actually

34

See id. (explaining that while the FAA requires arbitration agreements to be written, the agreements
do not need to be signed; companies have imposed arbitration by including the “agreement” in documents
that are rarely read by the consumers, including: “small print notices, envelope stuffers, . . . warranties
contained in boxes or sent to consumers in the mail” on websites, and delivered via email).
35
See id. at 1641 (outlining that credit card companies frequently send their customers small print
notices constituting an arbitration agreement only after the customers have already obtained and used the
credit card.).
36
See id. (outlining that, although not all securities investors are well educated, it is reasonable to
assume at, on average, they are better educated than members of the general public; therefore, consumers
presented with arbitration agreements in phone contracts, credit card contracts, and other common
transactions may not have previously seen, been aware of, or understood what the arbitration clauses
actually compel).
37
See id. at 1641-42 (contending that companies are increasingly using mandatory arbitration clauses
to “shorten statutes of limitations, limit or eliminate discovery, require a claimant to file in a distant forum,
prevent consumers from joining together in a class action, or bar consumers from recovering particular
forms of relief (injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, or attorney fees).”).
38
See generally Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1648-53.
39
See id. at 1649-51 (explaining that consumer and employment arbitration agreements can deter the
imposed party from seeking recourse through the arbitrator selection, imposition of high costs, and
limitations on the remedies afforded if vindicated); see also David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to
Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in the Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997
WIS. L. REV. 33, 110 (arguing that submission to arbitration is actually a prospective waiver of a
substantive right); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 637, 675 (1996) (arguing that the imposition of
binding mandatory arbitration is contrary to public policy).
40
See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174,
1179 (1983) (noting that empirical studies have shown that adhesive contracts are unlikely to be read by the
consumer).
41
See id. (noting that even if consumers have read adhesive contracts, they are even less likely to
actually understand what they have read); see generally Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy
and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233 (2002) (analyzing research showing that literate adults are
rarely able to discern pertinent information from contracts).
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notice the clause.42 “In short, under most reasonable definitions mandatory arbitration is
nonconsensual, given that consumers and employees don’t typically read or understand
the clauses.”43
Proponents of the expansion of consumer arbitration, however, advance that these
concerns are often overstated.44 First, proponents argue that adhesion is not unique to
arbitration agreements, but is also commonly found in contract formation outside
arbitration agreements.45 Second, proponents argue that consumers and employees have
greater access to justice through the use of arbitration than they would have through
traditional legal systems.46 Third, proponents argue that there is no danger in imposed
mandatory arbitration agreements because courts strike down the few mandatory
arbitration clauses that do overreach.47 Finally, proponents argue that imposing
mandatory arbitration is necessary, because without such imposition, consumers and
employees would never agree to arbitrate disputes postdispute.48

42

See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 911-13 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (showing that AT&T spent
substantial resources developing how best to implement their arbitration provision to minimize resistance
by consumers).
43
Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1649.
44
See generally id. at 1653-58.
45
See id. at 1653; see also Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law
(With a Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 200 (1998) (noting
that adhesive contracts are a typical form of contract formation, and that arbitration clauses are also typical
because it is just another aspect of the contract that the party is not fully informed of or aware, like most
“boilerplate” language of the contract). But see Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1653-54 (arguing that while
adhesion is used in banking, insurance, and other areas, the substantive content of those agreements is also
regulated by federal and/or state law).
46
See Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1654; see also Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The
Stakes in the Debate over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
559, 563-64 (2001) (using the metaphor that it is better for every employee to be given a new Saturn
vehicle than a few select employees be given new Cadillacs in arguing for mandatory employee arbitration;
“[a] properly designed arbitration system . . . can do a better job of delivering accessible justice for average
claimants than a litigation-based approach”). But see Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1654-55 (arguing that
arbitration does not guarantee better access to justice compared to legal settings because consumers and
employees in arbitration are not guaranteed counsel, it may be harder to obtain counsel, there is no
indication that there have actually been more claims in arbitration than there were in traditional legal
processes, and it is improper to take away rights to the court systems and jury trials).
47
See Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1655; see also Sherwyn et al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration
of Employment Disputes Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the
Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 119 (1999) (“Courts will only enforce arbitration policies that
provide a fair process for the adjudication of employees’ statutory rights”). But see Sternlight, supra note
11, at 1655-56 (arguing that the Supreme Court has frequently limited the ability to apply state common
law on unconscionability or fraud in voiding arbitration agreements, and that consumers and employees
must overcome a higher burden of proof, that has been placed on the consumers of employees).
48
See Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1656; see also Estreicher, supra note 46, at 567 (arguing that either
plaintiff or defendant in a given dispute would favor litigation over arbitration because of their perceived
position of strength). But see Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1656-57 (arguing that voluntary postdispute
arbitration is not impossible and often achieved in Great Britain).
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B. Current Trends and Implications
Regardless of the arguments for or against its use, the use of mandatory consumer
arbitration is growing, albeit at an undetermined rate.49 Although the exact rate in the
increase of the use of arbitration is uncertain, it is all but certain that the use of arbitration
is now thoroughly pervasive throughout society.50 Indeed, “[i]t is not a hyperbole to state
that civil justice or adjudication in the United States . . . is achieved primarily through
arbitration.”51
Despite the widespread use of arbitration in business-to-consumer transactions,
there have been recent indications that the practice is not as common in business-tobusiness transactions. A recent Rand Institute study showed that more than 75 percent of
consumer contracts contained an arbitration clause, while only 6 percent of their nonconsumer, non-employment contracts contained an arbitration clause.52 In the same
study, companies typically voiced concerns over predictability in using arbitration in
business-to-business transactions.53 Specifically, companies had concerns over increased
trends toward the inclusion of litigation tactics in arbitration, making the process
potentially more costly than regular litigation.54 These concerns may indicate that
companies are more likely to receive a desirable outcome when using arbitration in a
business-to-consumer transaction than in a business-to-business transaction.
Whatever the reason for the increase in consumer arbitration, it is unlikely to slow
barring a change in Supreme Court jurisprudence or congressional authority.55 It logically
follows that as use of arbitration increases, concerns over selection bias likewise
increase.56 More specifically, arbitration service providers such as the American
Arbitration Association and the National Arbitration Forum compete against each other

49

See Carbonneau, supra note 13, at 235 (explaining that there is no reliable data measurement for the
extent of arbitration); see also Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1658 (finding that “researchers have found it
very difficult to evaluate mandatory arbitration, for a number of reasons.”).
50
See Carbonneau, supra note 13, at 235-36 (explaining that the American Arbitration Association
alone conducts over 100,000 cases annually, JAMS has an annual revenue of hundreds of millions of
dollars annually, and the use of international commercial arbitration departments by law firms); see also
Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” To Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration
Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 62 (2004) (finding at least
one-in-three of sampled business include a form of mandatory arbitration in their consumer contracts).
51
Carbonneau, supra note 13, at 236.
52
Douglas Shontz, Fred Kipperman & Vanessa Soma, Business-to-Business Arbitration in the United
States: Perceptions of Corporate Counsel, Rand Institute for Civil Justice, 2 (2011), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR781.html (last visited April 3, 2013).
53
Id. at 25.
54
Id.
55
See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?:
Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19, 52 (1999) (“If courts are unwilling to examine
the reality of contract formation [in a consumer-commercial dispute setting], then the FAA may itself need
to be amended to protect important rights of the one-shot consumer who cannot effectively bargain with a
repeat play contractor.” (footnotes omitted)).
56
See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974) (discussing the advantages “repeat players” obtain over
“one shooters” in the legal systems); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 55, at 34 (explaining how the one-shot
player in alternative dispute regimes will be at a distinct disadvantage compared to the repeat-player who
“controls virtually all aspects of the disputing process.”).
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to provide arbitration services to companies for future consumer disputes.57 These
companies are paid for providing such services, 58 and are more likely to receive repeat
business if their client companies are satisfied with the prior services. Similarly, the
companies are more likely to receive repeat business if their clients are satisfied with
their prior service. Therefore, arbitral tribunals have a natural incentive to provide
companies with “satisfactory” proceedings, because companies displeased with the
results of a particular arbitration provider may change providers to receive more
favorable results.59
Not everyone agrees with these charges of potential bias. “[P]roviders and
arbitrators vehemently deny the charge that they are biased. . . . Yet, critics maintain that,
consciously or unconsciously, arbitrators may slant the result in companies’ favor.”60
Despite denials by service providers, there is some statistical support to the charge that
repeat-players are favored by the neutral arbitrator.61 Statistical analysis shows that
companies who arbitrate a higher number of cases get consistently better results from the
very same arbitrators.62 Additionally, individual arbitrators who rule in favor of firms
over consumers tend to receive a greater numbers of cases from those firm in the future.63
Beyond merely providing more favorable results, some institutions have gone
further, promising to be more friendly to businesses and removing individual arbitrators
who rule against companies in subsequent cases.64 “What is clear is that, because the
decision to choose a biased arbitrator often holds few consequences and affords a
company the opportunity to save costs on unfavorable judgments, the existing incentive
57

Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1650.
See id.; see also Cole, supra note 24, at 772 (“The arbitrator is likely to feel pressure to find
in favor of the permanent party, the employer, in most cases because industry members will more
frequently appear before the arbitrator. In addition, in many employment arbitrators, the employer
pays the arbitrator’s entire fee. The sense that the employer ‘owns’ the process as a result may
influence the arbitrator’s ultimate resolution of the case. An arbitrator who regularly finds in favor
of complaining employees may be certain that the employer will be reluctant to rehire her in the
future.” (citation omitted)).
59
Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1650; see also Cole, supra note 11, at 217 (“An institutional party, who
chooses arbitration to resolve all disputes, may have an advantage over the party who may utilize the
arbitral process only once, and only because his contract with the institutional party requires him to do so.
In this situation, the institutional party may develop informal relationships with the arbitrator, creating an
incentive for the arbitrator to find in its favor.” (citation omitted)); Cole, supra note 24, at 771 (“An
employer using arbitration to resolve disputes has the incentive to compile information about potential
arbitrators and their past decisions and develop a relationship with those arbitrators. The former will allow
better predictability of arbitral outcomes. The latter will potentially allow the employer to influence the
outcome of the arbitration.” (citation omitted)).
60
Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1650; see also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 55, at 53 (“[W]e do not
actually know much about whether one-shot consumers do worse in merchant operated arbitration or
privatized dispute resolution systems than they do in court or in other for a (or if they do nothing at all).
We assume they do fare worse because we assume that dispute resolution systems chosen and maintained
by one of the disputants therefore must benefit that disputant. Why else would all these institutional
disputants be defending their arbitration systems so vigorously against consumer legal attacks? It is clear
that such institutional disputants believe that they do better, and that such systems are cheaper and better
for them than other forms of disputing, but we do not really know.”).
61
See Farmer, supra note 11, at 2357 (citation omitted).
62
See id.
63
See id.
64
See id. at 2357-58
58
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scheme for arbitrator choice is unacceptable.”65 If this growing bias problem is believed
to be truly unacceptable, one method to address the matter would be to implement a more
stringent standard of review for evident partiality.
III. EVIDENT PARTIALITY
A. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.
The basis for current standards on evident partiality stems from the Supreme
Court’s 1968 opinion of Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co. 66
In Commonwealth Coatings, the Supreme Court addressed the question of what level of
impartiality is required in arbitration disputes.67 The Court held that arbitrational
decisions required impartiality, but left open the question of what standard applies in
determining whether evident partiality exists.
Commonwealth Coatings involved a dispute between a contractor and a
subcontractor regarding a painting job.68 The contract between the parties contained an
arbitration clause,69 which provided that, in the event of a dispute, each party would
select an arbitrator, and the two party-appointed arbitrators would select the third
arbitrator.70 The facts of the case reveal that the third “neutral” arbitrator had previously
engaged in consultations for individuals involved in business construction projects.71 The
prime-contractor was one of the individuals, and regularly hired the arbitrator to conduct
consulting work.72 Although the arbitrator had not been employed by the primecontractor for more than year prior to the arbitration at issue, the parties had previously
been involved for four or five years prior.73 Additionally, the arbitrator had been engaged
in business dealings involving other aspects of the construction project that was subject to
the dispute.74 None of these prior business dealings were disclosed by the arbitrator or
opposing party prior to the conclusion of the arbitration.75 Upon learning of the prior
dealings, the subcontractor challenged the arbitral award.76 The District Court refused to
vacate the award,77 and the Court of Appeals affirmed.78 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari,79 and reversed.80
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Justice Black, writing for the plurality,81 adopted the standard that evident
partiality exists when there is the “impression of possible bias.”82 Under this standard,
arbitrators must disclose “any dealings that might create the impression of possible
bias.”83 To comply with the standard, arbitrators must disclose any connection,
relationship, or dealings with parties that might show even possible bias, and thus evident
partiality.84
Justice White, joined by Justice Marshall, wrote a separate concurring opinion to
provide “additional remarks.”85 Justice White attempted to limit evident partiality to
instances where the arbitrator failed to disclose relationships that had a “substantial
interest” to the dispute.86 He opined that arbitrators should not be automatically
disqualified due to the failure to disclose a trivial relationship, or because of a prior
business relationship that both parties were aware of, but only where the arbitrator had a
“substantial interest” in the underlying dispute.87
Following Commonwealth Coatings, the differing standards of “impression of
possible bias” and “substantial interest” created a confusing framework for evident
partiality that necessitated a case-by-case approach throughout the circuits.88
B. Reasonable Person Standard
In 1984, the Second Circuit addressed evident partiality post Commonwealth
Coatings in Morelite Construction Corp. v. New York District Council Carpenters
Benefit Funds.89 Morelite arose from a dispute over the alleged non-payment of
contributions to the Benefit Funds pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement
(“CBA”).90 Pursuant to the CBA, the parties entered into arbitration. The arbitrator’s
father was, at the time of the arbitration, the Vice-President of the international union in
which New York District Council Carpenters Benefit Funds (“District Council”) was a
member.91 Morelite challenged the choice of the arbitrator prior to the proceedings, but
81
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the challenge was denied by the District Court.92 The issue proceeded to arbitration, and
a decision was entered in favor of District Council.93 After the decision, Morelite
challenged the award, arguing that the arbitrator’s father’s position created evident
partiality in the arbitrator.94 Despite the familial relationship, the award was upheld by
the District Court.95
The Second Circuit, after reviewing Commonwealth Coatings, concluded that
“[b]ecause the two opinions are impossible to reconcile . . . we must narrow the holding
to that subscribed to by both Justices White and Black.”96 As such, the Court held that
the reasoning of Justice Black’s opinion must be treated as mere dicta. 97 The Court then
proceeded to examine the different standards offered by Commonwealth Coatings.
The Court first considered Justice Black’s “appearance of bias” standard, but
determined the standard was too low to create evident partiality.98 Likewise, the Court
concluded that a “proof of actual bias” standard was too great, being hard, if not
impossible, to practically prove.99 Instead, the Court adopted a “reasonable person”
standard, finding “evident partiality . . . where a reasonable person would have to
conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to the arbitration.”100 Applying this
standard, the Court concluded that there was evident partiality, reasoning that “we are
bound by our strong feeling that sons are more often than not loyal to their fathers, partial
to their fathers, and biased on behalf of their fathers.”101
Following the decision in Morelite, the Second Circuit again considered the duties
of evident partiality in Applied Industrial Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve
Sanaji, A.S.102 The Court reiterated the application of the “reasonable person” standard in
determining evident partiality, but also created a duty to investigate. 103 The Court held
that if an arbitrator believes that a “nontrivial conflict of interest might exist,” the
arbitrator must either investigate the potential conflict, or disclose why the arbitrator
believes that there may be a conflict.104 Further, if the arbitrator does not choose to
investigate the potential conflict of interest, the arbitrator must disclose to the parties the
intent to not investigate the potential conflict of interest.105
In addition to the Second Circuit, the First Circuit,106 Fourth Circuit,107 and Sixth
Circuit108 all use some form of the reasonable person standard when evaluating evident
partiality.
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C. Reasonable Impression of Partiality Standard
The Ninth Circuit first addressed Commonwealth Coatings implications on
evident partiality in Schmitz v. Zilveti.109 The case involved a dispute that was submitted
to National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) arbitration.110 Three arbitrators
were selected to conduct the arbitration,111 and one of the arbitrators failed to conduct a
conflicts check with the parties.112 The conflicts check would have revealed that the
arbitrator’s firm represented a party company on numerous occasions.113
After the arbitration, the party challenged the award on evident partiality
grounds.114 The District Court concluded that an arbitrator need only disclose the facts
that they are actually aware of at the time of the arbitration.115 Because the arbitrator was
not actually aware of the conflict at the time of the proceedings, the District Court held
that the lack of knowledge protected the arbitrator from showing evident partiality.116
The Ninth Circuit overturned the District Court’s decision, holding that “‘evident
partiality’ is present when undisclosed facts show ‘a reasonable impression of
partiality.’”117 “Though lack of knowledge may prohibit actual bias, it does not always
prohibit a reasonable impression of partiality.”118 Additionally, the court held that
arbitrators may have an independent duty to investigate conflicts of interest.119 A
violation of this independent duty can create a reasonable impression of impartiality.120
The Court concluded that the arbitrator did have such a duty to investigate under the
NASD Code,121 but because the arbitrator failed in this duty, the court found that there
was a reasonable impression of partiality warranting vacatur.122
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IV. REPEAT ARBITRATION UNDER CURRENT EVIDENT PARTIALITY STANDARDS
I believe that repeat player bias, regardless of the motivation, should constitute
evident partiality under either the “reasonable person” or “reasonable impression”
standard.123 Under the reasonable person standard, it is not required to show that the
arbitrator is actually biased, the standard allows vacatur for evident partiality merely
when a reasonable person would conclude that the arbitrator was partial to one party to
the proceedings.124 The foundation to this conclusion does not need to be a provable fact,
but can be based on the mere suspicions of a reasonable person.125
Under the reasonable person standard, a contingent, future financial relationship
between a party and the arbitration provider would seem to allow a reasonable person to
conclude that the arbitrator is partial to the business party. The business party will likely
be involved in more frequent arbitrational proceedings than the one-shot consumer,126
and the business party will rationally seek arbitration from the same organization if prior
results were satisfactory.127 Thus, it seems entirely reasonable that the arbitrator may be
partial to the business party in order to ensure future business, and therefore in violation
of the reasonable person standard to evident partiality.
Likewise, repeat-player bias would constitute evident partiality under the
reasonable impression of partiality standard. The reasonable impression of partiality
standard creates a showing of evident partiality when the disclosed and undisclosed facts
about an arbitrator give rise to a “reasonable” impression that the arbitrator may be partial
to one of the arbitration parties.128 This standard, like the reasonable person standard,
does not require a showing of actual bias or partiality, but allows for evident partiality
when the facts would permit a mere reasonable inference of partiality.129
Mandatory consumer arbitration may also fall within this standard. The less
sophisticated consumer often does not fully understand the limitations and requirements
123

The opinions in this section are entirely the author’s. The author has found no case law dealing
with treatment of a repeat player to an arbitration proceeding. As such, all conclusions are speculative.
124
See Section III(B), supra.
125
See Morelite Constr. Corp. v. New York City Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79,
84 (2d. Cir. 1984) (“[W]e are bound by our strong feeling that sons are more often than not loyal to their
fathers, partial to their fathers, and biased on behalf of their fathers.”).
126
See Cole, supra note 11, at 217 (“An institutional party, who chooses arbitration to resolve all
disputes, may have an advantage over the party who may utilize the arbitral process only once, and only
because his contract with the institutional party requires him to do so. In this situation, the institutional
party may develop informal relationships with the arbitrator, creating an incentive for the arbitrator to find
in its favor.” (citation omitted)); see also Cole, supra note 24, at 771 (“An employer using arbitration to
resolve disputes has the incentive to compile information about potential arbitrators and their past decisions
and develop a relationship with those arbitrators. The former will allow better predictability of arbitral
outcomes. The latter will potentially allow the employer to influence the outcome of the arbitration.”
(citation omitted)).
127
See Cole, supra note 24, at 772 (“The arbitrator is likely to feel pressure to find in favor of the
permanent party, the employer, in most cases because industry members will more frequently appear before
the arbitrator. In addition, in many employment arbitrators, the employer pays the arbitrator’s entire fee.
The sense that the employer ‘owns’ the process as a result may influence the arbitrator’s ultimate resolution
of the case. An arbitrator who regularly finds in favor of complaining employees may be certain that the
employer will be reluctant to rehire her in the future.” (citation omitted)).
128
See Section III(C), supra.
129
Id.

337

imposed by the contract and the arbitration clause.130 Likewise, it is unlikely that the
business party would disclose whether it regularly conducts arbitration proceedings
though the selected arbitration organization. Such a failure to disclose would lead to a
reasonable impression of partiality due to the inferences that can be drawn by the
arbitration provider desiring a continued financial relationship with the business party to
the proceedings. Therefore, this impression should also constitute evident partiality
under the reasonable impression of partiality standard.
V. EVIDENT PARTIALITY, REPEAT ARBITRATION,
COLLECTION OF RELIABLE COMPARISON DATA

AND

THE

NEED

FOR

THE

Currently, there are a variety of proposals for how to limit the impact of potential
bias in mandatory arbitration.131 My proposal for how to treat repeat players for evident
partiality purposes is to increase the availability of data related to the prevalence and
outcomes of repeat arbitration. Increased availability of data would allow for increased
statistical analysis of whether use of repeat arbitration is harmful to consumers, or an
unnecessary worry.132
Using statistics to evaluate arbitration decisions is not novel.133 Recently, in an
effort to collect data on recent arbitration proceedings, California passed a law mandating
arbitration providers to publish certain data related to their administrated arbitration
proceedings over the previous five years.134 The law requires that arbitration providers
disclose the name or names of the non-consumer parties to the proceedings, the type of
dispute involved in the proceedings, who was the prevailing party, whether the nonconsumer party had previously been a party to an arbitration proceeding with the current
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arbitration provider, and the name and fee of the arbitrator to the proceeding, as well as
other related data.135
However, California law alone will not be sufficient to truly examine trends in
repeat arbitration.136 For such data collection to be complete and successful, it will have
to be collected not just from California, but from every state. Therefore, I propose the
implementation of a nation-wide disclosure law, implemented nationally through
Congress, and modeled after the California law.137
The law would require the same disclosures as the California model, and would
entail publication in a similar manner. The data collected could then be analyzed for
evidence of statistical bias or partiality in repeat arbitration. Specifically, such data
would allow for a comparison between the rates of success of non-consumer parties in
mandatory arbitrations, compared to rates of success of non-consumer parties in postdispute voluntary submissions.
The data would also allow for more analysis as to whether businesses shop for
favorable arbitration proceedings, and how often parties change arbitration providers
after an unsuccessful arbitration proceeding (as compared to a successful arbitration
proceeding). Statistically significant findings here would give support to the notion that
businesses do shop for the most beneficial arbitration provider, and that arbitration
providers thereby have incentive to find in favor of the business. Together, these and
additional studies would examine whether the use of mandatory arbitration is
unintentionally biased, actually biased, or whether there is no concern at all to the
practice.
In isolation, although a national disclosure law would not independently prevent
bias or impartiality, it would create a mechanism through which necessary information
about bias or impartiality could be discovered.138 With discovery of such information, I
believe current FAA provisions would be able to successfully protect consumers against
potentially biased or partial proceedings regardless of the actual findings.
VI. CONCLUSION
In sum, it seems clear that, barring a change in philosophy by the Supreme Court,
or modifications to the FAA by Congress, mandatory consumer arbitration will continue
to grow in the United States.139 Businesses that choose to impose arbitration will
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continue to be able to influence the process on a larger basis than their one-shot
consumers. Therefore, in order to protect the less sophisticated consumers from potential
repeat-player arbitration bias, it is important to facilitate the collection of data that will
allow study of whether such implementation is actually harming consumers.
Furthermore, if there is evidence of such harm, the information will allow for the practice
to be examined and disallowed under FAA Section 10’s prohibition of evident partiality.
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